In existing models of direct democratic institutions, the median voter benefits, but representative politicians are harmed since their policy choices can be overridden. This is a puzzle, since representative politicians were instrumental in creating these institutions. I build a model of direct democracy that explains why a representative might benefit from tying his or her own hands in this way. The key features are (1) that voters are uncertain about their representative's preferences; (2) that direct and representative elections are complementary ways for voters to control outcomes. The model shows that some politicians benefit from the introduction of direct democracy, since they are more likely to survive representative elections: direct democracy credibly prevents politicians from realising extreme outcomes. Historical evidence from the introduction of the initiative, referendum and recall in America broadly supports the theory, which also explains two empirical results that have puzzled scholars: legislators are trusted less, but reelected more, in US states with direct democracy. I conclude by discussing the potential for incomplete information and signaling models to improve our understanding of institutional change more generally.
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The first point has already been discussed: politicians introduce change when they are going to lose office. The innovation is in the second point. When this is added, we get a new result: even some politicians who foresee being reelected will want to introduce the change. An essential condition for point 2 is that voters have incomplete information. Voters remove politicians because they fear what they might do if reelected; politicians' actions before the election change the voters' expectations about this, and so politicians are constrained by elections to curry favour with the electorate. A politician who lessens the electorate's worries, by tieing her hands in the second term, may then increase her freedom of action in the first term.
My model shows that elected politicians may have long-term reasons to favour direct democracy. By long-term I mean that the action of introducing direct democracy is not taken into account as a way of gaining electoral support; I only examine the comparative statics of politicians' welfare with and without direct democratic constraints. Also, politicians are purely policy-motivated. A strong office motivation could provide a simple explanation for politicians to introduce direct democracy, in the form of a simple trade-off: giving up policy power in exchange for more stable tenure in office.
(Of course, the simple explanation could be the right one. But in many cases direct democracy was introduced by idealists not opportunists: see Section 4.)
The model is based on some key assumptions. First, as mentioned, voters have incomplete information -that is, they are uncertain about the best policy to pursue. In this paper, electing a representative solves the problem of political ignorance: representatives have an incentive to become informed. (Exactly how this happens is not a trivial question but is not the focus here. 1 ) But representative democracy brings its own problem with it: representatives may not share the preferences of the electorate. The electoral mechanism provides a way to remove representatives who stray too far from what the voters want. My second assumption is that this mechanism is imperfect. There are occasions when representatives will not be disciplined by representative elections. For example, politicians who intend to retire at the end of their term, or who cannot run for re-election due to term limits, will not be constrained by elections. On certain issues, representatives may also believe that their policy choices will not be observed, because the issues are too complicated or boring for the electorate to understand. Because of these occasions, voters have an interest in the real preferences of those they elect, and they may also benefit from introducing a second kind of control of politicians -direct democratic restraints. For example, the constitution may state that given enough signatures, a law passed by the legislature can be subjected to a popular referendum. This is the case in about half the states of the US and in some other countries. Or, given enough signatures, the populace may vote to pass a law themselves, whatever the legislature's wishes. This is the ballot initiative institution, again available in about half of US states and in other countries.
Viewing direct democratic institutions as a curb on the actions of the representative leads to the third assumption: these institutions interact with representative democracy. This happens in at least two ways. First, popular referendums and ballot initiatives are introduced in response to the perceived shortcomings of the policy implemented by representatives.
For example, in 1978 California's voters backed Proposition 13 -a swingeing tax limitation which is still controversial 30 years later -not because they were convinced in the abstract of the need for direct popular control over taxation, but because they thought that existing taxes, set by the legislature, were too high. In game-theoretic terms, the representative's choice of policy provides information to voters about the state of the world. Second, the availability of direct democratic measures affects representative elections, by affecting both voters' and representatives' choices. Voters will be less concerned about a representative's policy preferences if they know that these can be overridden. Representatives will behave differently in the light of that knowledge.
My final assumption is about the different ways direct and representative elections work to discipline politicians. A ballot initiative or referendum involves overriding a political decision. That is, the voters change their representative's policy and put another one in its place. In the model this happens after the politician's policy is revealed, but before that policy's consequences are revealed (and experienced). Representative elections, by contrast, are about judging a political decision after the consequences. The trade-off is between ex ante ignorance and learning from bitter experience.
1. Kessler (2005) endogenizes the choice to become informed and shows that representatives will do so if the cost of acquiring information is not too high. When they do not do so, there is no advantage to representative democracy. Some other assumptions built into the model are more commonplace but also deserve mention.
First, phrases like "the electorate's preferences" implicitly assume such a thing exists. If politics is one-dimensional -if it is basically about choosing left-wing or right-wing policies -then this is justified, since the median voter's preferred outcome will be a Condorcet winner (Black 1948) . 2 Many positive political theorists believe instead that politics is multidimensional, since many different issues must be decided over, and that as a result there is no "will of the people" (Riker 1978 ). For in a multidimensional policy space, there is generally no Condorcet winner (McKelvey 1976 , Schofield 1978 .
If so, then median voter results are irelevant. This pessimism is unjustified. Work since the classic chaos results of the 70s has clarified and moderated their conclusions. If voters are strategic, and anticipate the results of future votes, then despite the chaos theorem, equilibrium policy outcomes will be relatively central (McKelvey 1986 ). These results have been confirmed experimentally (Bianco et al. 2006) . The same applies if voting is probabilistic (Coughlin 1992) . These results suggest that even though politics is multidimensional, the simplification to one dimension is benign.
Second, politicians are policy motivated rather than office motivated. Adding in office motivations would surely be "realistic". Opportunistic, office-motivated politicians would be more tolerant of direct democracy, since the trade-off here is that direct democracy may move policy away from the politician's choice, but may also help him get reelected. The theory shows that even in the extreme case of pure policy motivations, elected politicians may prefer direct to representative democracy.
Third, election promises are not binding. Again, this is clearly a simplification, as is the opposite approach of assuming politicians can make fully binding commitments. With binding commitments, direct democracy would be unnecessary.
Finally, all players are risk-averse over policies. That is, they care more about a small shift in policy when that policy is already far from their ideal. This is important to the model since even extremists will prefer narrower distributions of policy centred around the median voter: other things being equal, they prefer to bind both their allies' and their opponents' hands. These assumptions are summarized in Table 1 .
The key idea of this paper, that the interaction between different kinds of elections provides a motive for elected representatives to support direct democracy, could be modeled in different ways. For example, suppose that politicians vary on some dimension of policy preference, which the voters learn about only after observing an incumbent's policy choices, and on another dimension of, e.g., competence. Under representative democracy, the median voter will face a trade-off between competence and extremism. Politicians above a particular indifference curve will be reelected. Under direct democracy, the indifference curve will shift (Figure 1 ). Policy extremism will matter less, since the voters can hold this in check with referendums or initiatives, and competence will matter more. So competent extremists will be more likely to be reelected. They then have a reason to favour direct democracy.
2. This is not literally true when votes are over lotteries -quadratic utility, used here, is a special case (Banks and Duggan 2006) . But the spirit of results in incomplete information voting is similar, see Coughlin (1992) . I focus on a different trade-off, which exists even when politicians only vary along a single dimension of policy preference. This is rooted in a particular complementarity between the kinds of elections. Initiatives and referendums substitute the uninformed choice of the median voter for the informed but perhaps non-centrist choice of the politician. They therefore work best when they are not used, i.e. when the median voter can trust the politician's choice. In effect, from being an elected dictator, the politician becomes a kind of adviser (though with strong agenda power): the voters can choose to accept or reject his proposals. While an extreme dictator is always dangerous, an extreme adviser can be corrected for. Knowing a politician's preferences helps the voters decide when to trust him. For example, a left-winger who chooses a rightwing policy is less likely to be motivated by ideology than by a recognition of political circumstances.
This in turn means that both the median voter, and an incumbent politician, can gain from the incumbent's reelection.
On the other hand, direct democracy is not very useful with a newly elected politician whose policy preferences are unknown. So direct democratic restraints shift the voters' calculations in favour of the incumbent.
Another insight follows from this. Since direct democracy allows a wider range of incumbents to be reelected, the average policy distance between voters and politicians increases. This suggests a theoretical basis for one finding that has puzzled empirical researchers: voters trust their politicians less in states with direct democratic institutions (Kelleher and Wolak 2007) . The effect of direct democracy on representative characteristics is an interesting avenue for empirical research.
The next section reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 discusses historical evidence from the development of direct democracy in the United States during the Progressive era. The conclusion assesses the prospects for incomplete information and signaling models of institutional change more generally.
Literature review
There is a large literature on endogenous institutional change. I focus on existing explanations of deliberate change, as opposed to unintended evolution (e.g. Greif and Laitin 2004) . I also focus on rational choice theories, which assume that actors have some sense of their interests and form rational expectations, however hazily, about the future. Other factors such as myopia, chance and character certainly influence institutional change but it is extremely hard to weave them into a systematic theory. Finally, I examine the literature on reforms of an existing stable system, rather than "constitutional choice" in an institutional vacuum (e.g. O 'Donnell et al. 1986; Przeworski 1991; Bawn 1993 ).
These reforms are often paradoxical, because they are made by powerful actors -the winners under the existing system.
Why, then, would they risk changing it? We can categorize existing theories by how they answer this question. First, there are efficiency theories. In these, change takes place because it enables all the players to become better off. This includes the case when winners gain more than losers and can compensate them. To avoid vacuity these theories require an explanation for the times when change does not take place. For example, it may be that under some circumstances players cannot make credible commitments to compensate losers. Geddes (1991) suggests that Latin American civil service reform takes place when political parties are roughly equal in strength, so that both lose more from patronage -in effect they are in a Prisoner's Dilemma, which reform can eliminate. Rogowski (1987) claims that states with open economies are more likely to have proportional representation as a way of mitigating the inefficient distributive politics more associated with first-past-the-post systems.
Second, powerful actors may make reforms under pressure from a rising opponent. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Boix (2003) claim that the rich allow transitions to democracy so as to avoid revolution. Relatedly, those in power may change the rules so as to head off the rise of their competitors, following Di Lampedusa's advice that "everything must change so that everything can stay the same". For example, it has been suggested that ruling parties brought in proportional representation so as to avoid being wiped out electorally by rising socialist parties (Rokkan 1970 , Boix 1999 .
Similarly, Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni (2001) show how the Mexican PRI set electoral rules so as to grant some, but not too much, power to its opponents, thus sustaining its hegemony for most of the 20th century. Dunleavy and Margetts (1995) have a broadly similar theory of changes in pluralist democracy as being designed to preserve existing elites from the threat of change in a multi-dimensional policy setting, though they also give some implicit credence to the efficiency explanation.
Third, if a group has power, but does not expect to keep it for long, they may change institutions as a way to embed their interests. This is particularly relevant in democratic contexts which already have some institutionalized ways to change leadership. McCubbins et al. (1987) theorize that regulations on bureaucracies are designed to ensure that the political coalition which creates a new law is able to monitor its enforcement. Political changes can effect more permanent changes in the balance of power. Thus Benoit (2004) builds a general theory in which political institutions are changed when there exists a coalition with "fiat power" to change institutions (e.g. with enough of a majority to change the constitution), every member of which will benefit from the change.
A final group of explanations is closest to the spirit of this paper: that of institutions as "credible commitments". North and Weingast (1989) explain the institutions brought in by the Glorious Revolution as a way for the sovereign to commit not to expropriate his subjects. This then allowed greater economic growth, which in turn benefited the sovereign. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) emphasize that when under pressure, the rich offer democracy as a way to credibly commit to redistributive policies. If they simply promised redistribution, this promise would be broken in times of political stability, and so would not be credible. These papers do not invoke incomplete information: it is assumed that the sovereign would always expropriate if he needed to (the rich would never redistribute if they could avoid it). The literature on the political economy of central bank independence suggests that a Left-wing party may grant central bank independence so as to neutralize voters' worries about its monetary policy (Milesi-Ferretti 1995) . This will make the party more electable, so that it can afford to introduce its preferred policies in other areas.
How do these theories fare at explaining the introduction of direct democracy in the United States? The issue is as follows. The constitutional amendment introducing direct democracy was introduced in most states by the legislature, before it was voted on by the people. 3 Before direct democracy was introduced, legislatures made the law. Afterwards, the people could veto those laws by popular referendum, or introduce laws the legislatures did not want by the ballot initiative. Also, the populace as a whole cannot be a bargaining partner: there is no way that the median voter can "commit" to reelecting legislatures in exchange for any possible gains (cf. Acemoglu 2003) . Thus, efficiency explanations are unlikely to work. Nor does it seem plausible that these reforms were granted for fear of something worse.
Indeed, handing over law-making power was often a gateway to further constitutional changes. For example, in Oregon, after the 1905 legislature tried to bring in a constitutional convention in order, it was rumored, to rescind the new direct democratic provisions, citizens initiated a constitutional amendment allowing a constitutional convention only after a popular vote. And unlike changes to electoral institutions, direct democracy provides no way to buy off particular opponents and preserve an incumbent's power.
3. In Oklahoma, Arizona and Massachusetts a specially elected constitutional convention brought in direct democratic measures as part of a wholesale rewrite of the state constitution.
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The third explanation seems more plausible: reformists gained temporary power, then introduced direct democracy so as to give the people a veto in case their successors undid their reforms. This argument fits many cases quite well (see Section 4), and the model here formalizes the intuition. However, there remain problems. The people's veto was a double edged sword which could be -and was -used against reformers. In a complete information setting, only politicians who are very likely to lose power will wish to tie their successors' hands in this way. Furthermore, as de Figueiredo (2002) points out, politicians with a long-term perspective can bargain with political opponents to preserve each others'
reforms. Finally, constitutional changes in most US states required a 2/3 supermajority in the legislature; and at this time, legislative constituencies were heavily biased towards more conservative rural areas and against the new industrial cities (David and Eisenberg 1961; Hamm and Moncrief 1999) . These factors together made it hard to achieve a legislative supermajority for direct democratic reform made only out of extreme reformers who expected to lose office.
The model here combines this explanation with the "credible commitment" story. Some extreme candidates for office, who do not expect to get reelected, prefer direct democracy because it will bind their successors. But less extreme candidates also prefer direct democracy, because voters who can vote down extreme policies in a ballot initiative have less desire to forestall those policies by voting a candidate out. This in turn lets some candidates implement policies closer to their ideal point. Thus, just as a party might delegate power to a central bank in exchange for more freedom in other areas, a party or candidate may return power to the voters in exchange for more freedom in the face of representative elections.
Incomplete information plays a key role in this story, as it does not in previous credible commitment models of institutional reform. Voters always prefer politicians whose preferences are closer to their own, so if politicians' preferences are visible, they will always prefer an incumbent if and only if he or she is closer than the average to the median voter, whatever the democratic institutions (see Section 3.2). When politicians' preferences are unknown, voters must learn about them from the policies they choose. The restraints of direct democracy make it less tempting for extreme politicians to choose centrist policies so as to get reelected, since they will not be able to do what they want after the election.
This in turn means voters who observe a given policy choice will believe the incumbent to be relatively more centrist, and so they reelect after a wider range of observed policy outcomes. In the thesis conclusion, I discuss more broadly how incomplete information models could apply to institutional change.
Empirical research has not found a very compelling general explanation of the spread of direct democracy. Scarrow (1997) examines the expansion of direct democracy in Germany and finds that parties introduced the reforms in the quest for short-term electoral advantage. Thus, there was a breakdown of long-term cooperation between the parties, driven by strong inter-party competition. However, in the case which interests us -the introduction of statewide initiative and referendum by state parties, i.e. where parties choose to limit their own power -all her cases show collaboration between the major parties. She explains this as a reaction to declining turnout. This may be a reasonable explanation but it assumes that parties take a long-term perspective on the health of democracy as a whole, which sits oddly with the short-termist competition used to explain other changes. Bowler et al. (2002) survey legislators' support for direct democratic reforms in 3 nations. In their theoretical section they admit candidly that "legislators will find direct democracy an unappealing institution". They do find that ideology predicts support for reforms, which fits the theory presented here. However, predicting behaviour from surveyed opinions, at best a hopeful enterprise, is particularly problematic in this case. (The same applies to , which finds quite high levels of expressed support for direct democracy among legislators.) They conclude by suggesting that reforms will be forced on weak legislators by outsider coalitions.
This argument deserves further attention. It fits many of the states which introduced direct democracy, complementing the case in which reformers gain temporary power (again, see Section 4). And it is intuitively attractive: if legislators have no reason to bind their hands, they must have been forced to do so. However, there is a problem of commitment on both sides. First, legislators may promise to support reform but fail to deliver once in office. Indeed, Bowler etal.
write "[i]t is not surprising... to find examples of legislators supporting bills in favour of CIRs [Citizen Initiated Referendums] while in Opposition, yet opposing an identical bill, or letting authorizing legislation languish, once they win Government". Second, voters or interest groups who have threatened to punish these non-performing legislators may face the problem that the alternative is no better.
Assuming incomplete information -i.e. that voters do not know exactly what their representatives' political preferences are -could resolve these problems in two ways. First, a vote for institutional reform may convince voters that a particular politician is on their side, thus providing them with a forward-looking incentive to vote for him, and therefore giving him an incentive to support reform. This is not modelled here but would be an interesting avenue for future research. Second, the institutional reform itself, by weakening politicians' power to implement extreme outcomes, may make voters relatively more tolerant of politicians, and so some politicians may actually prefer direct democratic institutions. Even some politicians who would be reelected under representative democracy can implement policies closer to what they really want under direct democracy and still get reelected (Proposition 2). This second possibility is modelled
here, and provides a new explanation for the introduction and survival of direct democratic institutions.
This paper also adds to the collection of formal models of direct democracy. The classic complete information models are Romer and Rosenthal (1978) and Gerber (1996) . In the Romer-Rosenthal "setter model" the monopoly agenda-setting power of a resource-maximizing bureaucrat means the median voter does not achieve his ideal point in a direct democratic process, in contrast with the competitive model of representative elections. Gerber introduces a representative with an exogenous ideal point who may be threatened by a direct democratic agenda setter; now, this threat may force the representative to move policy towards the median voter, compared to the outcome of unrestrained representative democracy. Besley and Coate (2001) present a model in which direct democracy benefits citizens indirectly by "unbundling" some issues from representative elections. The aim is to explain why direct democracy may bring outcomes closer to the will of the majority, even when representatives compete for election -a process not modelled in the papers above. In a complete information framework, they put forward different reasons why representative democracy may fail to respect the will of the majority on a particular issue, and show that direct democracy ameliorates this. Parties, who choose candidates and whose members may have different preferences from the population as a whole, play a crucial role. Introducing uncertainty about politicians' preferences, as I do here, means that representative democracy does not perfectly fulfil the median voter's preferences even without parties.
Some later models introduce incomplete information. Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) examine the trade-offs between direct democracy, elected representatives, and unelected bureaucrats. Kessler (2005) does the same in a model with a continuous policy space, and shows that direct democracy may lower elected officials'
incentive to become informed -a choice not examined here. The paper's framework is similar to what is presented here, but the interaction between direct and representative democracy is not fully modelled.
Uncertainty is pervasive, but the most important kind is surely the uncertainty of the voter about policy, as discussed in the Introduction. The model here uses a signalling framework to examine policy choice under direct and representative democracy when the voter is uncertain. The interaction between these two ways of controlling policy-makers generates a new insight: incumbent representatives may benefit electorally from direct democracy. Another insight is that direct democracy changes which representatives get elected, for the worse from the point of view of the median voter. Thus, the model gives a theoretical basis for two recent findings that have puzzled empirical researchers, and indeed seem contradictory at first sight. First, voters trust their politicians less in states with direct democratic institutions (Kelleher and Wolak 2007) . More importantly, direct democracy appears to improve legislators' reelection chances (Bali and Davis 2007) . This is a direct confirmation of the mechanism behind the model's central prediction, and a finding which existing theory fails to explain.
The model
There are two periods. In each period t = 1, 2 a politician observes a shock ε t ∼ N (0, σ ε 2 ) and chooses a policy p t . The outcome is w t = p t − ε t . (Numbered subscripts will be dropped when the sense is obvious.) The voters do not observe the shock, only the outcome in each period. All players' utility is quadratic in each period: total utility for a player with
2 where δ is the common discount rate. Rather than simply referring to time, δ can be interpreted as representing the tradeoff between periods 1 and 2, that is, the likelihood, over a range of issues and times, that a politician will be free of the threat of reelection. When this is very low, all players are more concerned with the "pre-election" period 1 effect of direct democracy. When δ is high they are concerned with period 2, and the possibility of restraining the politician with a ballot proposal.
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All players' ideal points are private information. After period 1, the voters vote to keep the incumbent or elect a challenger, by majority rule. The median voter's ideal point is 0; Banks and Duggan (2006) provide a median voter theorem for lotteries over outcomes when utility is quadratic. The incumbent and challenger's ideal points k are drawn from a normal distribution N (0, σ k 2 ) which is independent of ε. Write ϕ k for the density function of k and Φ k for its cumulative distribution function. Similarly ϕ ε and Φ ε for the shock.
In period 2 the politician is not facing reelection. However, under direct democracy, the voters observe p 2 before the policy is implemented, and vote to keep it or replace it by a default policy of 0. This is a rough analogue of a popular referendum process in which voters may choose to challenge the proposed policy and replace it with an existing default, which is assumed to be the optimal policy given the distribution of shocks. (This maximizes the voters' incentive to choose the default and thus makes life as hard as possible for the politician: if the default were less attractive, the politician would be better off.) 4 A more complete model would allow voters to do the same in period 1: we limit direct democracy to period 2 for simplicity's sake. We also allow the politician to step down after period 1 (for example, if the voters would never accept his policies in period 2, and he would do better under a challenger).
Voters learn the proposed policy p before voting on it in period 2. This can be thought of as the effect of an election campaign, in which those with extreme preferences (on either side of the issue) will make costly efforts to inform others about what is at stake, through advertisements, leaflets et cetera. Thus voters learn p (as opposed to the outcome they experience, w) only when there is a direct democratic campaign.
In any period, a politician who knows his ideal point k and the shock ε gets utility from a policy p of
This policy utility is single peaked with the peak at p = k + ε. Call q = k + ε the politician's induced policy ideal point.
Single-peakedness implies that, if policies within an interval [ p, p ] are available, and a point in the interval's interior p ∈ ( p, p ) is chosen, then q = p; otherwise a lower or higher policy would have been chosen instead. I sometimes refer to politicians with ideal outcomes k as k-types, and with induced policy ideal points q as q-types.
Results
The setup gives us a game of incomplete information. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is the standard equilibrium concept for this kind of games (see e.g. McCarty and Meirowitz 2007) . Using it I find a set of sensible equilibria. Unfortunately other, less sensible ones also exist: these are ruled out with the Intuitive Criterion, a well-known refinement for signaling games (Cho and Kreps 1987) . Essentially this requires that if an off-equilibrium action is observed, other players must assume that the deviating player hoped to gain something from the deviation. PBE imposes no restriction on beliefs off-equilibrium and this results in the odd equilibria.
We use the model to compare the expected welfare of politicians under the two different systems. The first proposition replicates the findings of the existing literature: if we ignore the effect of representative elections, no politician wants direct democracy. This is trivial. In period 2, under representative democracy, a politician gets exactly what she wants, while under direct democracy in general she does not.
Proposition 1. In period 2, any politician weakly prefers representative democracy to direct democracy, and an incumbent reelected from period 1 strictly prefers it.
All proofs are in the appendix. Figure 2 shows the basic form of equilibrium behaviour in the first period. If the outcome is in an interval around the median voter's ideal point of 0, then the politician is reelected. Politicians with ideal points in the interval implement their ideal outcome, taking into account the effect of the shock. On either side of this reelection region, there is an area where politicians choose the nearest endpoint of the region rather than their own ideal point: they accept a policy loss now, in order to get reelected and choose policy in period 2. Further out, politicians again implement their own most preferred outcome, and are not reelected. Figure 3 shows the politicians loss from "discipline" -choosing the nearest endpoint of the election region -and from "honesty".
4. An alternative assumption would be that there is an initiative process with some kind of open agenda-setting process in which the median voter can select the optimal initiative given p. If so, this essentially becomes a game of cheap talk in which the politician recommends p and the median voter chooses the ultimate policy. This assumption seems optimistic about the openness of direct democratic agenda-setting.
The reelection region is small enough that the voters prefer to reelect an incumbent politician who is at the endpointknowing that in fact, this politician would prefer a more extreme policy, and will try to implement it in the second period. If this condition is satisfied, then the voters will be happy to reelect the less extreme incumbents politicians who choose outcomes inside the reelection interval. On the other hand, the reelection region is large enough that voters will not reelect a politician who chooses something outside the reelection region. Since some policy outcomes are never observed in equilibrium -the dashed line in the picture -there is a range of reelection regions satisfying both this constraint and the endpoint reelection constraint. So we have multiple equilibria. Both direct and representative democratic institutions share this form of equilibrium. However, direct democracy makes two differences. First of all, the median voter's loss from reelecting an incumbent with a given ideal point is less, because in period 2, that politician can be prevented from choosing his own preferred outcome by a direct democratic vote. The same is not necessarily true for a newly elected challenger. As the median voter has no information about the new representative's ideal point, s/he is unable to know when to trust his chosen policy. This is described in more detail below.
Voters reelect
In general, direct democracy favours the period 1 incumbent as a known quantity.
The second effect works in the same direction: an incumbent has less to gain from being reelected in period 2, since he will sometimes be unable to get his policy accepted. Therefore, incumbents who are trading off a period 1 policy loss against the policy gain from reelection will be relatively more likely to choose their ideal point. So a smaller interval of politicians, with less extreme ideal points on average, chooses to get reelected by implementing an outcome on the edge
The model 11 of the reelection region. After observing this outcome, the median voter will reelect only if s/he expects an incumbent in this interval to be no more extreme than the average newly elected challenger. When politicians in the interval are less extreme on average, this constraint is loosened. This in turn means that the largest reelection region can be larger. Figure 4 shows the difference between equilibria under the different institutions.
Smaller interval moving inward

Direct democracy
Representative democracy
Larger reelection region We next look at period 2 in direct democracy in greater detail. (Period 2 in representative democracy is straightforward:
the elected politician implements her ideal outcome.) There are two cases. Either a challenger, with an unknown ideal point, has been elected, or the incumbent has been reelected, and, as we have seen, the voters know something about his ideal point -at a minimum, they know which side of the median voter he is on, and for centrist politicians they know his ideal point exactly, because he chose it in the first period. If a challenger has been elected, because voters do not know the likely direction of his bias, the choice to trust him or not is the same whatever policy he proposes. As it turns out, the voters accept any policy proposed if σ ε 2 > σ k 2 , and reject any policy proposed if σ ε 2 < σ k 2 , replacing it with the default of 0. In effect, the choice is between two kinds of shocks, one caused by the unknown policy environment and one caused by an unknown politician's difference from the median voter.
The case with a reelected politician is quite different. Even if the politician is very extreme, because the direction of his bias is known, it can be accounted for. Indeed, whenever the proposed policy goes against the politician's bias, the voters know they will do better by accepting it. That is, if the politician proposes p 2 < 0 and the voters know k 2 > 0, they will always accept p 2 instead of the default policy of 0. I.e., if a rightwing politician prefers a more leftwing policy to the default, the median voter will have the same preferences. So, whenever the shock leads the politician to "go against" his prior belief, his policy proposal is accepted. As the saying runs, it takes a Nixon to go to China (Cukierman and Tommasi 1998).
Intuitively, we might expect a rightwing politician proposing an extremely rightwing policy to be voted down. This is not necessarily true. If the politician were really extreme, he would not have been reelected in period 1: a very rightwing policy means he must be countering a big leftwards shock. So there are possible equilibria in which very rightwing policies are accepted when a moderate rightist proposes them. However, for simplicity, we assume that when a rightwing politician proposes any rightwing policy, it is rejected. This is the smallest possible equilibrium in terms of the set of policies accepted in period 2, and therefore the worst possible equilibrium for politicians. If some politicians prefer direct democracy under this equilibrium, this will be true in all cases. Period 2 under direct democracy is illustrated in Figure   5 . We can now say a bit more about period 1. The different results when a challenger is reelected (his proposal is always accepted if σ k 2 σ ε 2 , and always rejected when σ ε 2 < σ k 2 ) make a large difference to the period 1 equilibria. In fact, if σ ε 2 < σ k 2 , a newly elected challenger is a useless object: the voters do not know enough about his ideal point to trust him, whatever policies he proposes! On the other hand, even a very extreme incumbent, whose ideal point is known, can be trusted some of the time. For this reason, in equilibrium when σ ε 2 < σ k 2 , incumbents are always reelected . This is an extreme result, but it contains the central intuition of this paper. Direct democracy turns politicians from dictators into advisers. A dictator whose preferences are known is still dangerous, but an adviser whose preferences are known can be corrected for. Thus, direct democracy raises the relative value of incumbency.
However, this extreme result only applies when σ ε 2 < σ k 2 -that is, when an unconstrained politician is actually worse for the median voter than choosing himself. When σ ε 2 σ k 2 , the result is less clear. (A really extreme politician would almost never propose a trustworthy policy in period 2, so the voters would usually choose the default policy of 0 and suffer the effects of the policy shock. So it is better for them to elect an unknown challenger if he is fairly trustworthy.)
Concretely, what does σ ε 2 < σ k 2 mean? The variance of ε measures the unpredictability of the policy environment -not necessarily objectively, but to the voters. A number of factors affect this. σ ε 2 will be lower when voters have direct knowledge of outcomes, for example when they feel the effects of the economy on their pocketbooks, whereas it will be higher for, say, the progress of a foreign war. σ ε 2 will be low for "easy" policy areas such as abortion law, and high for abstruse ones such as financial crisis management. It will be low when there is widespread consensus on the best course of action, and high when experts disagree. Finally, σ ε 2 will rise during times of social change and fall when social patterns are well-known, stable and predictable. On the other side of the inequality, σ k 2 is rather easier to understand.
When politicians are trustworthy, or when the campaign process provides a lot of information on candidates so that bad ones can be weeded out before taking office, σ k 2 will be low. In times when politicians are untrustworthy, and when the campaign process is uninformative, σ k 2 will be higher. It will also be low when parties are strong, and are able to commit to well-defined programs, and high when parties are weak and individual candidates rely on their local power base rather than on campaign promises. I argue below that during the Progressive Era in America, σ k 2 was high.
When σ ε 2 < σ k 2 , before reelection, some incumbents prefer direct democracy (contrast this with Proposition 1). This does not only include extremists, who are not reelected and therefore want to bind their successors hands; there are always some politicians who would be reelected under representative democracy, but who nevertheless prefer direct democracy.
Their loss from direct democracy in period 2 is balanced either by being reelected instead of removed from office, or by being reelected with a policy closer to one's own ideal point. 
If the voters always know the sign of k and have bounds on
at the start of period 2, then the following is a possible equilibrium: Equilibria when σ k 2 < σ ε 2 can be complex. In particular, even politicians who would get reelected by choosing their ideal point in period 1 do not necessarily do so. There may be an incentive to move towards the centre so as to persuade the electorate that one is more centrist, in order to get more policies accepted in Period 2. (In the smallest equilibrium described in Lemma 2 point 3, this does not happen.) I hypothesize, but do not prove, that for some values of the parameters and some equilibria, there are politicians who prefer direct democracy even though they are reelected under representative democracy, as in Proposition 2.
A complete information benchmark
To emphasize the effect of voters' incomplete information in the model, we can compare it with a benchmark in which everything is unchanged except that the voters learn a politician's ideal point k with certainty after he is elected.
Under representative democracy, voters know that the incumbent will implement his ideal point in period 2. So after period 1, they ignore w 1 and simply reelect the incumbent iff k 1 2 σ k 2 i.e. if |k 1 | σ k . Therefore, in period 1 the politician always chooses w 1 = k 1 .
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Under direct democracy, whether the incumbent or a challenger is reelected, the voters know k 2 in period 2, and set the acceptance region A accordingly. As the voters' loss in period 2 is increasing in |k 2 |, 5 again in period 1 they reelect if and only if k 1 2 σ k 2 . Once again, in period 1 the politician chooses w 1 = k 1 . As politicians who will not be reelected wish to control their successors through direct democracy, and politicians who will be reelected do not wish to be controlled, the following proposition is now easy to see. (Ignore the strategic issues of policy choice in the legislature and just assume that only politicians who will not get reelected prefer direct democracy: the logic is generally quite plausible.) Then, even if all legislators are newly elected, all those with ideal points |k| < σ k -within one standard deviation of the mean, i.e. about two-thirds of legislators -will prefer representative democracy. And if some legislators were reelected the proportion of opponents would get even higher, making a pro-reform majority, let alone a supermajority, rare indeed.
Adding incomplete information changes the story, so that even politicians in a strong position may favour direct democracy. This improves the odds of a reform passing. It also seems to fit the historical facts, to which I now turn.
Historical Discussion
How did direct democracy come to the US? 6 The standard story is as follows. In the 1900s, the political system in most US states came to be seen as broken. Legislators were in hock to special interests from business. The electoral system had been corrupted in some municipalities; on the other hand, many new industrial cities were grossly underrepresented by their allocation of seats in the legislature. Neither of the main parties was trusted: turnout and partisanship, high throughout the 19th century, declined. (In terms of the previous section, σ k 2 was high.)
The ideas of direct democracy were first taken up by the Populists in the 1890s, seeking a way round the corrupted and unrepresentative system of state representative democracy. The Populists did not succeed in general, but they did pass the first state initiative law in South Dakota. In the 1900s a succession of reformers such as William U'Ren continued the fight and eventually forced legislatures to concede in half the US states. Supporters of direct democracy included the Progressive movement, Labor unions and farmers' groups, as well as some Prohibitionists, all of whom hoped to use the ballot box to circumvent obstructionist legislatures.
This story shows us two of the mechanisms for institutional change discussed in Section 2. First, a group that gains short-term power, but does not expect to keep it, may use reform to entrench the policy changes it wants. This is what the Populists did in South Dakota. Similarly, in Oklahoma, direct democracy was introduced by a constitutional convention which was 90% Democratic. Previously Republicans had dominated state politics; this was the turning point. Later the Democratic legislature restricted direct democracy. The change of heart suggests that at convention time,
Democrats sought to protect their preferred policies from Republican legislators; they changed their mind only when they foresaw a stable period of Democratic power. Similarly, in Arizona, a constitutional convention introduced direct democracy.
5. This is shown by equation (21) in the Appendix.
6. This section draws on Allswang (2000) , Piott (2003) , Goebel (2002) , , Lubinski (2002) and Haynes (1919) , in particular on the detail in Piott's book.
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The more important theory is simply that divided or weak legislators may be pressured by outside forces into accepting change. In Oregon, the indefatigable activist William U'Ren got himself got himself elected along with the Populists, and then used logrolling tactics to win over the divided major parties in the legislature, offering Populist legislators' votes in exchange for support for direct democracy. Before the bill introducing the initiative and referendum came up for a second vote in 1901, U'Ren helped legislators who had voted for him before get reelected; further lobbying ensured it passed again. By 1904 U'Ren, now a formidable political force in the State, could say of a measure threatening the new institutions: "The man who votes for the Brownell bill... is digging his own political grave and getting into it." 7 In some state elections, the Direct Legislation League extracted pledges to support direct democracy from candidates for the legislature. For instance, in the Maine election of 1906, many candidates who had not pledged their support lost their seats; both houses of the subsequent legislature unanimously passed a moderate bill to introduce the initiative and referendum.
These theories are powerful and explain many of the historical cases. They also have the advantage of explaining the overall pattern that direct democracy was introduced mostly in Western states. These states had weak party systems so that candidates cared more about their individual electoral fortunes than about preserving the legislature's power as a whole. Reformers had less success in the East where parties were strong, and in the one-party South.
However, the history also reveals other actors who were instrumental in introducing direct democracy in many states.
First, there were "reform" or "insurgent" Democrat and Republican politicians, progressives who aimed to wrest control of their parties from the machine. They were disciplined political groups, not divided individuals, and rather than gaining temporary power, they aimed to take over the political mainstream in the long-term, and often succeeded.
When, as often, they supported direct democratic measures, they did so out of principle rather than short-term expediency. 1918 (although they also rejected several referred statutes and legislative constitutional amendments). Again, it seems that at least some legislators foresaw they could work better within the new system. Similarly, in Arkansas, after the original direct democracy measure of 1910 had been weakened by the courts, a new law was brought in by the legislature in 1916, but failed at the polls after opposition by prohibitionists. In Michigan, where the Republicans were dominant and were to remain so until the 1930s, a constitutional convention passed a weak measure in 1908; in 1912, prodded by the state governor, the legislature strengthened it.
7. Quoted in Piott (2003) Governors' support of direct democracy has continued to this day, as witness Arnold Schwarzenegger's use of ballot initiatives in 2005. Perhaps one reason is that it allows them to get round an obdurate legislature. But representative politicians introducing their own initiatives is a relatively modern trend (Smith and Tolbert 2001) . In the Progressive era the trade-off modeled above seems a more likely cause of their support.
To sum up, outside pressure on legislators was not enough to introduce direct democracy. Nor, except in the cases of North and South Dakota, did Populist radicals achieve this aim. As Piott puts it (p. 254): "progressive control of state government was key to winning legislative approval of these measures." Often, these progressives were within the main parties and had long-term goals to keep their political power, and often, they introduced reforms not when electorally weak or divided but after winning elections with large majorities. They must therefore have gained something beyond short-term advantage from doing so. I suggest there were two long-term advantages: direct democracy could restrain their opponents who might regain office through the remaining corruption in the political system; and it would win back the electorate's trust, allowing them to pursue their goals more effectively when in power. 8
One question is harder to answer. How predictable was the political environment of the Progressive era -in terms of the model, how high was σ ε 2 ? Clearly, the 1890s were a time of economic change and dislocation. At the same time, by the 1900s, a coherent Progressive program had been formed on a number of issues, and certain states and cities had undertaken reforms and thus acted as pathfinders for others. It seems probable that by the 1910s, when most of the direct democratic reforms were brought in, many voters saw politicians less as stewards to face an unknown and uncertain environment, and more as agents who ought to be implementing a thoroughly worked-out program of reform, whose outline at least was clear.
Conclusion
Top-down institutional reform, in which those in power voluntarily give it up, is the hardest kind of institutional change to explain. The introduction of direct democracy is one such tough case. Existing theories fail to appreciate how hard it is: in general, to change the constitution, a supermajority of legislators must be won over. This paper has suggested that even without internal divisions between those in power, it may still be possible for democratic representative to do better under direct democracy. The power handed over is compensated by increased trust at the time of representative elections. Historical data and voting data supports my case.
Two broader conclusions come out of this research. For research on direct democracy, there are complex links between representative and direct elections. We already know how legislators may be threatened by the initiative (Gerber 1996) , learn from initiatives in nearby states (Boehmke 2005) , or seek to weaken their implementation (Gerber et al. 2001 ).
Scholars have observed that politicians are getting directly involved in initiative campaigns (Smith and Tolbert 2001) .
For example, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger called a special election for five initiatives in 2005. Modelling this process, in particular of politicians' and initiative proponents' role as trusted agents, could enhance our understanding further (see also Garrett 2004) . In particular, the interaction between House, Senate and Governor seems likely to help explain direct democracy's appeal to the political class: Governors can use ballot initiatives to bypass the legislature as a whole and the House majority may wish to override recalcitrant Senators the same way.
More generally, our present models of institutional change tend to see the world as a bargaining process in which people know what they are getting. There is room for a middle ground between this rational-choice approach and the historicists who emphasize uncertainty and habit. Incomplete information, signalling and trust ought to be brought in to our understanding of institutional change.
8. A point I have not discussed is that in the era described, the median voter under direct democracy could be very far from the median voter for the legislature, due to malapportionment and other forms of corruption. If Progressives believed that they were close to the real median voter, while their future opponents might be far on the other side, this would strengthen their motives to support direct democracy.
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for e small enough all incumbents with k ∈ ( − e, e) will choose w = ± e. Since w 1 ∈ ( − e, e) is thus not observed in equilibrium, the voter's beliefs on that interval are unrestricted and can be set so that E(k 2 ) > σ k 2 , justifying the voters in rejecting the incumbent. This is then a PBE. To limit the set of equilibria I use Cho and Kreps' Intuitive Criterion (see e.g. McCarty and Meirowitz 2007) .
First, in any equilibrium, R ∅, i.e. some outcomes result in reelection. For otherwise, every type k would choose w = k and so not reelecting after w would not be sequentially rational for w 2 < σ k 2 . Also, R must be closed, since otherwise an incumbent with ideal outcome k R but k a limit point of R could achieve a net expected loss approaching zero from above by choosing w ∈ R arbitrarily close to k, but could not actually achieve a loss of zero and would thus have no equilibrium strategy.
Next, fix R and let BR(k) be the set of best response outcomes w to implement for a politician with ideal point k. I prove the following.
, where the inequality holds for every element of the best response sets.
Proof. If k ∈ R then BR(k) = {k} and BR(k ′ ) k for every element, as the best response to k ′ is always either
If k > max R , then BR(k) ⊂ {max R, k} and if max R BR(k) then max R BR(k ′ ) since the loss from choosing max R increases when k increases, while the loss from choosing w = k is constant. Thus the Lemma holds in this case. Similarly when k < min R.
In the remaining case k R but there are points of R below and above k. As R C is open, define (w, w ) to be the largest open interval in R C around k, and define ŵ = w + w 2
, the halfway point of this interval. Thus w ∈ R.
If k ′ w then BR(k ′ ) w and BR(k) w , by the same argument as the previous paragraph. If k ′ < w then
Also, as k ց w, BR(k) → {w} since the loss from w goes to zero while the loss from k or w remains positive;
2 has at most one crossing point in (w, w ): the two endpoint utilities cross at the halfway point ŵ = w + w 2
; for the other two crossing points, the uniqueness can be shown from the quadratic formula.
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Clearly if BR(k) never includes k for k ∈ (w, w ), then we are done, for the best response sets are simply {w} then {w }, with {w, w } at the halfway point. Also, if there is only a single connected interval I on which k ∈ BR(k) for k ∈ I, we are done as the best response sets are {w} then {k} then {w } with one or two crossover points.
I show that if k ∈ BR(k) anywhere on (w, w ), then the halfway point ŵ ∈ BR(ŵ). Take the contrapositive: sup-
and there is only one crossing point in the interval; similarly on k ∈ (ŵ , w ) u(k, k) < u(w , k). Thus k BR(k)
for any k ∈ (w, w ).
Now if ŵ ∈ BR(ŵ ) we must have only a single connected interval I including ŵ on which k ∈ BR(k) for k ∈ I, and this completes the proof. For otherwise, u(k, k) would have to cross either u(w, k) twice to the left of ŵ where u(w, k) > u(w , k), or u(w, k) twice to the right of ŵ . And this cannot be true because each pair of functions has only one crossing point.
Furthermore, except at isolated points of indifference, BR(k) is a singleton set. Therefore, any possible best response function will be increasing in k. Given this, along the equilibrium path E(k 2 |w) is strictly increasing in |w|: if w ′ > w then the lowest k-type playing w ′ is higher than the highest type playing w.
Next, if w, w ′ ∈ R and w < w ′ then w ′′ ∈ R for any w ′′ ∈ (w, w ′ ). This establishes that R is a single connected interval.
The reasoning is as follows. Suppose false. Then it must be that
This can only be the case if w ′′ is never chosen in equilibrium. Otherwise, (16) would be contradicted by E(k 2 |w)'s being strictly increasing in |w| along the equilibrium path, given that w and w ′ are both chosen in equilibrium (by types k = w and k = w ′ ).
If w ′′ is never chosen in equilibrium, we invoke the Intuitive Criterion to bound E(k 2 |w ′′ ). The Criterion states that off equilibrium at w ′′ , the support of the voters' beliefs must be composed only of k-types who would improve on their equilibrium utility by playing w ′′ , given some best response to w ′′ (and some belief). So, this support can at most contain ktypes who would improve on their equilibrium utility by playing w ′ ′ and getting reelected. (If reelecting after w ′′ is not a best response to any possible belief, the support is even more limited, as utility from playing w ′′ and not getting reelected is lower.) Clearly, all types k w (resp. k w ′ ) could do better than playing w ′′ and getting reelected by playing w (resp. w ′ ) and getting reelected; and so they must be doing at least as well as this in equilibrium. Thus the support of voters' beliefs is limited to types between w and w 
Politicians with ideal policy
at the start of period 2, then the following is a possible equilibrium: A = R − when k is known positive, A = R when k = 0, A = R + when k is known negative.
Proof.
1. First, consider the period 2 incumbent's behaviour. The incumbent observes the shock ε and his own ideal point k,
and has a resulting policy ideal point q = k + ε. He must propose a policy p. Suppose this policy is accepted iff p ∈ A, the acceptance region. Otherwise the default policy of 0 is chosen. We will assume 0 ∈ A, since the politician can always get 0 by proposing it. The following describes his best response: if q ∈ A, propose p = q for a loss of 0, the best possible outcome; otherwise, propose the closest point in A to p. (If 0 is the closest point in A to p then we assume he proposes 0 rather than proposing any point not in A.) Write A C for the complement of A, the rejection region.
2. Given this politician behaviour, the voters must figure out whether to accept p or not. If p is in the interior of A, then by single-peakedness of preferences, voters can infer q = p. If p is a boundary point of A, they will have a truncated probability distribution over q, updated from their prior. (Their prior belief over q, with cdf Φ q , is the convolution of Φ k with the distribution of ε. For example, if they know k for sure, then Φ q (q) = Φ ε (q − k).) From our description of the politician's behaviour, it follows that for p ∈ A, the voters' posterior Φ q|p (q |p) has a support [ q(p), q (p)] and for p ′ > p with both in A, q(p ′ ) q (p), i.e. the voters' belief is increasing in p.
Beliefs after observing p A are off the equilibrium path and unconstrained. Because of this, many equilibria are possible in period 2. For example, the voters could reject all proposals, A = ∅, and could hold beliefs such that any proposal was worse for them than the default policy. We reduce this proliferation using the Intuitive Criterion. In this case, this reduces to the following: suppose p A so that p is not observed in equilibrium. We require that the voters' belief ϕ(q|p) satisfies ϕ(q|p) > 0 only if p would be strictly preferable for the q-type to their equilibrium action, under some rationalizable action by the voters. Call the q-type's equilibrium action p ∈ A. Since 0 ∈ A we have that (p − q)
0)
2 , so if the voters reject p this would not be strictly preferred to p . Thus we require that the q-type strictly prefers that the voters accept p: (q − p) 2 < (q − p ) Suppose p 0, p ∈ A C and the voters believe that k 0 for sure. Then by the Intuitive Criterion q < p/2 for sure, since otherwise the q-type would prefer 0 to p. Therefore ε = q − k q < p/2 0. Since ε < p/2, p − ε > p/2. Say p − ε > 0.
Then 0 < p − ε < − ε, hence (p − ε) 2 < ε 2 so the voters prefer to accept p, contradicting p ∈ A C . Say p − ε 0. Then ε < p/2 < p − ε 0 so again the voters prefer to accept p, contradicting p ∈ A C . This shows that R − ⊂ A when k is known to be non-negative. A similar proof shows R + ⊂ A when k is known to be positive.
3. To show the equilibrium described is possible, I need to show that there are some beliefs satisfying the Intuitive Criterion such that p > 0 is always rejected when k is known to be positive and bounded. The Criterion requires only that q > p/2 so that the politician proposing p would strictly prefer this to the equilibrium policy of 0. Suppose the voters know k < k
′′
. Say p 2k
. Then k = k ′′ = q is a possible belief, so that ε = 0 and the voters prefer to reject p.
